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CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE t
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to review some of the funda-
mentals of probate practice having to do with claims against
the estate and to emphasize particular points of interest and con-
troversy in this area of the law. The article is not intended to
cover all the phases of probate practice that have to do with
"claims." It deals primarily with those situations covered by the
following articles of Chapter 30 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes:
Article 4, "Inventory and Collection of Assets," Article 6, "Allow-
ance and Payment of Claims," and Article 7, "Contingent Claims."
Nebraska probate practice comprises 93 different systems.
The variation arises because there are 93 counties and therefore
93 different county judges. It should be noted that these county
judges may be either law judges or lay judges. For the most
part, the law judges are good lawyers, especially in probate mat-
ters, but a few are now, and some in the future may be, young
and inexperienced. The situation with the lay judges is much
more variable for the reason that a new lay judge usually enters
upon the discharge of his duties in probate matters with no
experience whatsoever, either in the law generally or in probate
practice in particular. However, after a few years experience, most
of these, to the benefit of the Nebraska Bar, have acquired con-
siderable skill and knowledge in the field.
In the more populous counties and in the county courts pre-
sided over by law judges, much of the detailed work with which
the attorneys are concerned is handled by the judge, his clerk
and his staff. The attorneys, either representing the estate or
the claimant, traditionally pay little or no attention to these details
but rely entirely upon the judge and his assistants. On the other
hand, in the smaller counties and in direct ratio to the size of
the county and the experience of the lay judge, the attorneys,
particularly the attorney for the estate, have a duty to the heirs
and the personal representatives to see to it that the judge actually
discharges the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by court
decision.
t Based upon material presented by Mr. Charles F. Adams, Aurora,
Nebraska, in an address at the Institute on Probate Administration.
Written by Staff Assistant Charles F. Noren, B.A. 1958, Nebraska Wes-
leyan University; presently a junior in the College of Law, University
of Nebraska.
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The entire body of law relative to the estates of deceased per-
sons, both by statute and by court decision, has been erected to
protect and enforce the rights of three distinct classes of persons.
First, the creditors, next the collector of death taxes, and finally
the beneficiaries.
II. PROBATE JURISDICTION OF COUNTY COURTS
County courts receive their general jurisdiction over matters
of probate directly from the Nebraska Constitution which states:
County Courts shall be courts of record, and shall have originaljurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of de-
ceased persons, and such proceedings to find and determine heir-
ship .... 1
This grant of original jurisdiction is made exclusive by statute.2
As to the particular topic under discussion in this article, power
over claims against the estate is granted to the county courts by
statute as follows:
The county court shall have power to hear and determine
claims and set-offs in the matter of estates of deceased per-
sons. .... 3
The judge of the county court has a duty to receive, examine,
adjust and allow all lawful claims and demands of all persons
against the deceased. 4 This original, exclusive jurisdiction applies
to tort claims,5 taxes against personal property, 6 foreign judgments
against the deceasedJ and generally any claim which a creditor
may have maintained against the deceased had he lived.8
The actions that can be brought against the executor 9 are
rather limited, and well set out in the statutes. Both actions for
the recovery of personal or real property, and actions requiring
1 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 16.
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-503 (Reissue 1956).
3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-504 (Reissue 1956).
4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-601 (Reissue 1956).
5 Mueller v. Shaklett, 156 Neb. 881, 58 N.W.2d 334 (1953).
6 Millet v. Early, 16 Neb. 266, 20 N.W. 352 (1884).
7 Creighton v. Murphy, Neal & Co., 8 Neb. 349, 1 N.W. 138 (1879).
8 Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949).
9 The word "executor" as used in this article applies generally to all
personal representatives of estates regardless of title unless otherwise
indicated.
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special relief other than the recovery of money are permitted. 10
Certain actions on contingent claims may also be instituted against
the executor if the sections involved" have been carefully complied
with.
III. PROCEDURE PRIOR TO FILING CLAIMS
A. DUTY OF COURT TO ENTER ORDER AND CAUSE NOTICE
TO BE PUBLISHED.
Whenever letters testamentary or of administration are granted
by a probate court, it becomes the judge's duty to receive, examine
and allow all lawful claims against the estate of the deceased.
... Provided, the judge shall within forty days after the is-
suance of such letters . .. give notice of the date of the hearing
of claims . . . and the limit of time for the presentation of claims
v.. which notice shall be given by posting in four public places
in the county, or by publication in a legal newspaper of the county
three successive weeks, or in any manner which the court may
direct.12
Prior to the notice required by the above-quoted statute, an order
must be entered by the judge requiring such notice to be given.13
This order is also required when the heirs, devisees, or legatees
select the newspaper in which the notice is to be published. 14
The order preceding and requiring notice must include the
date of hearing and the limitation of time for filing claims.' 5 There
is strong dictum that the order must also include the manner in
which notice is to be given, and if by publication, the name of
the newspaper and the dates of publication."6
B. DUTY OF ATTORNEY FOR ESTATE.
Although the law enjoins the duty upon the court to give
the notice, the attorney for the estate must make sure that the
10 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-801 (Reissue 1956).
11 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-704, 30-705, 30-706 and 30-714 (Reissue
1956).
12 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-601 (Reissue 1956). The definition of "legal
newspaper" is found in NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-523 (Reissue 1956).
13 In re Estate of Neville, 121 Neb. 15, 235 N.W. 666 (1931).
'4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-602 (Reissue 1956).
15 Supra note 13.
16 2 WHITFORD, NEBRASKA PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 662
(1957).
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court does in fact discharge its duty. He must also see that the
notice is published in conformity with the order and is free from
defects and errors.
C. MAILING COPY OF NOTICE
In 1957 the legislature enacted new legislation which has ap-
plication "in any action or proceeding . . . where notice by pub-
lication is given as authorized by law."' 7 It requires the "party
maintaining the action or proceeding" to mail a copy of the pub-
lished notice "to each and every party appearing to have a direct
legal interest in such action or proceeding."' 8
Whether this statute requires the executor as the "party
maintaining the . . . proceeding," to mail notice to the creditor,
as a "party appearing to have a direct legal interest," has not been
completely determined. In 1959, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in
Storm v. Cluck,'9 indicated that published notice, pursuant to a
court order, is sufficient in probate matters and it makes no dif-
ference whether the creditors had actual knowledge of the time
allowed for filing claims.20 It must be noted, however, that the
facts of this case occurred prior to the enactment of the statute.2 '
IV. FORMS OF ORDER, NOTICE AND CLAIM
A. Ix GFmmAL
As could be expected from 93 different probate courts, the
forms that are used vary greatly. Some counties, including Hamil-
ton, Clay and Hall, use the form promulgated by the Nebraska
Supreme Court.22 Other counties, like Lancaster and Platte, still
17 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-520.01-.01 (Reissue 1956).
Is NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-520.01 (Reissue 1956). This legislation was
supported by the organized bar who felt that recent United States
Supreme Court cases indicated that due process of law required such
notice. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) where-
in the Supreme Court stated the rule of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) as follows: ". . . if feasible,
notice must be reasonably calculated-to inform parties of proceedings
which may directly and adversely affect their -legally protected in-
terests." For action of the Judicial Council see 37 NEB. L. REV.
104 (1958).
19 Storm v. Cluck, 168 Neb. 13, 95 N.W.2d 161 (1959).
20 Id. at 20, 95 N.W.2d at 166. But see City of New York v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
21 Supra note 17.
22 For rules of the Nebraska Supreme Court see 162 Neb. 29 (1956).
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include in the first creditor's notice a time limit for payment of
debts. 23
B. ORDER BARRING CLAIMS
Although nothing in the statutes requires an order barring
claims and such an order would seem to be repetition of the order
fixing the date for filing, an order barring claims may have its
usefulness.24  Several courts incorporate within the order entered
at the expiration of the time for filing claims an additional order
baring further presentation of claims. Other courts incorporate an
order barring claims in the final decree. This order may serve the
useful purpose of affirmatively establishing what otherwise might
be presumed, namely that the court has not extended the time
for filing claims. 25
C. VERIFICATION OF CLAIMS
There is nothing in the statutes which requires a claim to be
verified under oath. Some courts, including Lancaster County,
provide a form to be used by a person filing a claim which merely
requires the signature of the claimant. This particular form also
contains a space for the approval of the claim by the executor,
thus enabling the county judge to enter the proper order allow-
ing claims without a hearing.
V. CLAIMS THAT MUST BE FILED
A. GENERAL DEFINITION
The word 'claim' must, by necessity, have a uniform sense
throughout the probate statutes and be held to include every
species of liability which the executor or administrator can be
called upon to pay, or provide for payment of, out of the general
fund of the estate.2 6
Prior to the above-quoted definition, the court had held that
"claims" were only debts existing against the decedent at the
23 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-610, 30-612 and 30-622 (Reissue 1956) ap-
parently authorize and perhaps require such an order and a published
notice to this effect.
24 2 WHITFORD, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 700 (1957).
25 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-604 (Reissue 1956) allows such extensions of
time by the court.
26 In re Estate of Edwards, 138 Neb. 671, 675, 294 N.W. 422, 425 (1940).
See also 41 A.L.R. 183 (1926).
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time of death.2 7 But since 1940 the court seems to be following a
more liberal definition like the one above.28
The definition really depends upon whether the obligation
must be filed as a claim even though not existing as a debt against
decedent at the time of his death. For example, expenses of
funeral and last illness must be filed to take advantage of the
priority provisions of the probate code.20 On the other hand, debts,
such as expenses of administration, may be filed and allowed as
claims, although they properly come before the court in the ex-
ecutor's report.
B. DECEDENT'S OBLIGATIONS, DuE OR PAST DUE, FOR THE PAYVIENT
OF MONEY'
Only one type of obligation will be mentioned here, that of
installment alimony payments. After the death of the husband,
a prior judgment for periodic alimony payments cannot be revived
unless the decree provided that payments should be made out of
the estate of the decedent. However, those arrearages as of the
death are proper claims against the estate of the deceased. 30
C. FUNERAL AND LAST ILLNESS
By statute31 the payment of "necessary funeral expenses" be-
comes a preferred claim "not exceeding two hundred and fifty
dollars for casket and services of undertaker." Some questions
might be raised as to whether "necessary funeral expenses" in-
cludes tombstones, burial vaults or perpetual care. It would seem
that these expenses should be allowed as claims rather than placing
the creditor in a position where he would have to enforce his
"claim" against the executor or heirs.
Although the statute involved gives priority to the payment
of necessary funeral expenses, it does not relieve the husband
from a primary obligation to pay for the last sickness and burial
of his wife.32 If the will of the wife relieves the husband of such
27 In re Estate of Gifford, 133 Neb. 331, 275 N.W. 273 (1937); In re Estate
of Erickson, 78 Neb. 642, 111 N.W. 356 (1907).
28 Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d 856 (1949); Mueller v.
Shacklett, 156 Neb. 881, 58 N.W.2d 334 (1953).
29 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-615 (Reissue 1956).
30 Master v. Masters, 155 Neb. 569, 52 N.W.2d 802 (1952). See also 2
WHITFORD, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 726.
31 Supra note 29.
32 In re Estate of White, 150 Neb. 167, 33 N.W.2d 470 (1948).
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obligation, but the husband elects to take by the laws of intestacy,
he revives the obligation to pay these expenses.33
D. UNMATURED DEBTS
The court has the power to examine and allow, and the ex-
ecutor the power to pay, any debts that mature at some date in
the future.34 These claims must be absolute, but not yet due,
rather than contingent claims.
In re Estate of Larson35 involved a claim filed by the holder
of negotiable notes when the notes were not yet matured. The ad-
ministrator objected to the allowance on the grounds that since
these claims could not have been brought against the decedent
during his lifetime, the notes were not proper claims against the
estate. The court stated on page 546:
... where it is expedient and assets are available for this
purpose ... the court at any time [may] determine the present
value of the obligation and to make immediate payment thereof.
[.. T]he claimant may be required at any time to accept the
actual present value of his debt....
Although no constitutional question was raised by the parties,
Justice Rose, in his dissent,36 asserted that the unmatured claims
statutes37 were unconstitutional on the grounds that they impaired
the obligation of contract.
E. TORT CLAIMS
The cases in this area indicate that some lawyers have had to
learn the hard way that an action will not lie in the district court
against an executor for damages allegedly caused by the decedent.
The plaintiff must file his claim against the estate.38  The tort
33 Id. It should also be mentioned that the statutory priority given to
the claims mentioned here is subject to NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-205
(Reissue 1958). The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a valid
claim for personal taxes is a lien and claim against the assets of an
estate and takes priority over the preferred claims mentioned in
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-615 (Reissue 1956). See In re Estate of
Badberg, 130 Neb. 216, 264 N.W. 467 (1936).
34 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-607, 30-608 (Reissue 1956).
35 In re Estate of Larson, 138 Neb. 544, 293 N.W. 430 (1940).
36 Id. at 547, 293 N.W. at 432.
37 Supra note 36.
38 In Storm v. Malchow, 163 Neb. 541, 542, 80 N.W.2d 477, 478 (1957),
the court stated the rule of Rehn v. Bingaham, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N.W.2d
856 (1949) as follows: "A cause of action for personal injuries al-
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claimant must also file his claim within the time limited in the
first instance since grounds are seldom available for obtaining an
extension of time within which to file such a claim.39
F. CONTINGENT CLAIMS
Prior to the 1933 amendments to the contingent claims stat-
utes, 40 the holder of a contingent claim might, under certain cir-
cumstances, withhold filing his claim until after the initial period
for filing general claims had expired and still recover on his con-
tingent claim. The amendments, however, eliminated the element
of contingent claim from section 30-60941 and limited section
30-70442 to claims "not capable of being exhibited within the time
limited for creditors to present their claims."
In the case of In re Estate of Edwards,43 the court held that
sections 30-609 and 30-70444 must be read in connection with each
other. The court also defined a contingent claim as "one where
the liability depends upon some future event which may or may
not happen and which, therefore, makes it wholly uncertain
whether there will ever be a liability. ' 45
As the law now stands, it would seem to make little difference
whether a claim is contingent or not since it will be barred by
the general section of the probate code 46 if not filed within the
proper time unless, of course, the claim is "not capable of being
exhibited." If the claim is not capable of being exhibited, a re-
leged to have been proximately caused by negligence of a decedent
during his lifetime survives and when no action was brought thereon
during his lifetime, it must be prosecuted by a claim filed against
the estate of decedent in the county court which has exclusive origin-
al jurisdiction thereof."
39 Storm v. Cluck, 168 Neb. 13, 95 N.W.2d 161 (1959). Bear in mind
here that we are referring to claims against a decedent as distinguished
from actions by the executor to recover tort damages sustained by the
decedent or his next of kin.
40 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-704, 30-609 (Reissue (1956).
41 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-609 (Reissue 1956).
42 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-704 (Reissue 1956).
43 In re Estate of Edwards, 138 Neb. 671, 294 N.W. 442 (1940).
44 Supra note 40.
4G Supra note 43. See also In re Estate of Larson, supra note 35; In re
Estate of Gifford, supra note 27.
46 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-609 (Reissue 1956).
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view of Article 747 would seem to indicate that the executor is
liable only to the extent of assets still in his possession when this
claim becomes perfected. The heirs, devisees, or legatees, how-
ever, may be liable directly to the creditors.
48
G. CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL SERVICES
The general rule here is that services rendered by one in close
relationship to the decedent are presumed to have been gratUitious,
but this presumption is rebuttable upon clear and satisfactory proof
of an express or implied contract to pay for such services.49 If pay-
ment has been made for such services prior to the death of the
decedent, it will be presumed that payment was complete and a
claim to the contrary must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence.5 0
H. CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL TAXES
The county judge is required to furnish the county assessor
with a copy of the inventory of the estate, and the county assessor
then determines the taxes due. If there are taxes due, the county
treasurer must file a claim against the estate, and this claim takes
priority over the other claims against the estate.51
A recent amendment to sections 30-603 and 30-60452 provides
that the county treasurer shall certify that he has filed claims
for unpaid taxes, and that the county assessor shall certify that
an assessment of personal property in the estate has been made
for the current year and will be entered in the tax list. The
amendment further provides that the. county judge shall not order
any distribution of estate assets nor discharge the executor until
these certificates are filed. The last session of the legislature also
changed section 77-31853 to extend the time from three to five
years within which the county assessor may go back and add
omitted property for tax purposes.
47 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-701 to -715 (Reissue 1956).
48 The time limit for filing contingent claims is discussed in section VII
of this article.
49 In re Estate of Baker, 144 Neb. 797, 14 N.W.2d 585 (1944).
50 In re Estate of Olson, 167 Neb. 799, 95 N.W.2d 128 (1959).
51 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-316 to -319 (Reissue 1958).
52 NEB. SESS. LAWS 1959, ch. 126.
53 NEB. SESS. LAWS 1959, ch. 357. For other changes in NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 77-316, 77-318, see NEB. SESS. LAWS 1959, ch. 358.
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I. PROMISES TO PAY AT DEATH
Bare promises of the deceased to pay certain sums of money
to another after the decedent's death do not give rise to a claim
that may be filed against the estate. However, if the promise
was given for sufficient consideration to form a contract, a claim
based upon this contract may be filed against the estate.54 Also,
if the promise constituted a subscription or pledge, even though
not given for sufficient consideration to form a contract, the pledge
or subscription may constitute a claim against the estate. If so,
this claim will be subject to the implied condition that it is not
to be paid until the debts of the estate have been fully satisfied. 55
VI. CLAIMS WHICH NEED NOT BE FILED56
A. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS TO DEVISE
OR BEQUEATH
A contract to compel the specific performance of an agree-
ment to devise or bequeath is an equitable action and as such
must be brought in the district court.57 Such actions have in-
volved personalty alone5" as well as combinations of a bequest
of money and a devise of land.59 In such cases, the court continues
to hold that where a court of equity can afford complete relief
and by one decree adjudicate the rights of the parties, it may
do so and order specific performance of the contract.60 If the
district court takes jurisdiction over the entire subject matter
of the contract, it may, if the estate is solvent, determine any
amount owing under the contract and direct that the same be
allowed as an established claim against the estate."
54 Keller v. Estate of Hiles, 103 Neb. 465, 172 N.W. 363 (1919); In re
Estate of Griswold, 113 Neb. 256, 202 N.W. 609 (1925).
5 In re Estate of Luce, 137 Neb. 846, 291 N.W. 562 (1940).
56 Pending actions against decedent and personal taxes which could be
included in claims that need not be filed are covered elsewhere in
this article. A discussion of decedent's contracts for sale of land
could also be included here but were covered by others at the Probate
Institute and are therefore deleted from this article. See NEB. REV.
STAT. art 9-10 (Reissue 1956).
57 2 WHITFORD, PROBATE AND AND ADMINISTRATION 701-717
(1957).
58 Peters v. Wilks, 151 Neb. 861, 39 N.W.2d 793 (1949).
G9 Lacey v. Zeigler, 98 Neb. 380, 152 N.W. 792 (1915).
60 Lacey v. Zeigler, supra note 59; Sopeich v. Tangeman, 153 Neb. 506, 45
N.W.2d 478 (1951).
61 Id.
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Upon failure of the decedent to perform his agreement the
"beneficiary" of the contract may, if he elects, file a claim for
the reasonable value of services that were to be paid for by a
devise of property.6 2 However, a suit to enforce a contract to
devise real estate and a claim of money for reasonable value of
services are inconsistent and therefore not allowed. 63
B. DEBTS SECURED BY MORTGAGE
Where the debt of the decedent is secured by mortgage, the
mortgagee is not required to abandon the security and file his
claim against the estate. The mortgagee may bring a foreclosure
action against the property even though he does not file a claim
against the estate.6 4  If the mortgagee commences an action of
foreclosure after the death of the mortgagor, and thereafter files
a claim for the debt against the estate, he is not precluded from
prosecuting his foreclosure action.65
If the will provides for payment of the debt, or if the devise
expresses no intention that the devisee should take real estate
subject to the encumbrances, the debt is properly payable out of
the assets of the estate.66 This still does not deprive the mort-
gagee of his right of election to seek recovery of the debts out
to the personal assets of the estate by filing a claim, or to rely
on his security and foreclose, or both if necessary.
VII. EXTENSION AND LIMITATION PROVISIONS
A. LIMITATION BY FnRST COURT ORDER
Section 30-60367 directs the court to fix a time for filing claims
which, "in the first instance," shall not be more than eighteen
months or less than three months. Such time must be stated
in the order and presumably begins to run from the date of the
order, but this is not entirely clear.
62 In re Estate of Baker, 144 Neb. 797, 14 N.W.2d 585 (1944).
63 Flessner v. Wenquist, 156 Neb. 378, 56 N.W.2d 294 (1953).
64 Crawford State Bank v. McEwen, 132 Neb. 399, 272 N.W. 226 (1937).
65 Quesner v. Novotny, 116 Neb. 84, 225 N.W. 796 (1927).
66 Lienhart v. Conway, 146 Neb. 821, 21 N.W.2d 749 (1946).
67 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-603 (Reissue 1956).
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B. EXTENSION OF TnM FOR FILING
The court may, of its own volition, extend the time for filing
claims but the whole time shall not exceed two years.68 The
creditor may, within three months after the expiration of the
time for filing, apply for an extension of time to file his claim.69
"Good cause" must be shown for such extension and notice of the
extension, if allowed, must be in accordance with section 30-601.70
What constitutes "good cause" depends on the circumstances of
the case and the use of sound judicial discretion."1
C. FURTHER LMITATION PROVISIONS
A person who fails to file his claim within the time limit
first ordered by the court in the administration proceedings shall
be forever barred. In the event that no administration proceed-
ings have been started, the creditor is barred if he fails to institute
such proceedings within two years from the death of the dece-
dent.72  However, the statute73 specifically provides that it shall
not be construed to affect the time within which a creditor may
enforce a lien nor to affect actions pending against the decendent
at the time of death.
After the last published notice of the time limit for payment, 74
a creditor has two years within which to demand his debt be paid
or the same is barred.7 5 If the claim is allowed but unpaid, the
creditor has five years in which to file notice to this effect or
he will be barred.7 6 If the claim has been on file for five years
and no order of allowance has been entered, the claim will be
considered disallowed unless the creditor within such period files
a statement that the claim has not been paid.7 7
cs NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-604 (Reissue 1956).
69 Ibid.
70 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-601 (Reissue 1956).
71 In re Estate of Tucker, 128 Neb. 387, 258 N.W. 645 (1935); Lesoing
v. Dirks, 157 Neb. 183, 59 N.W.2d 164 (1953).
72 NEB. REV. STAT § 30-609 (Reissue 1956).
73 Ibid.
74 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-622 (Reissue 1956).
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-623 (Reissue 1956). This section probably has
no application to estate proceedings when notice of time limit for
payment of debt is not given.
76 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-623.01 (Reissue 1956).
77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-623.02 (Reissue 1956). The creditor or his at-
torney has the duty to see that the order allowing the claim, if any,
is properly entered.
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Particular notice should be called to section 30-714.78 This
section is included in the article dealing with contingent claims.70
However, the statute refers to any contingent "or other claims."
It provides that if notice to creditors is not given for one year
after granting letters testamentary or of administration, a creditor
has five years from said date to bring an action against the exec-
utor, heirs, devisees or legatees.8 0
VIII. EXECUTOR'S DUTIES AND LIMITATIONS
OF AUTHORITY
A. MUST PLEAD DEFENSE OF SET-OFF
When a creditor, against whom the deceased had a claim, pre-
sents his claim against the estate, it is the duty of the executor
to exhibit the claim of the decedent "in offset to the claims of
the creditor."'' Whether such claim of the decedent is a "set-off"
or "counterclaim" is not completely clear. Presumably the exec-
utor has the duty to interpose any defense, whether counterclaim
or set-off, that might have been available to the decedent.3 2
B. CANNOT WAIVE STATUTE OF NON-CLAIM
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the statute of
non-claim cannot be waived by the executor as a defense in an
action brought by a creditor.8 3 A leading authority in this field8 4
cites two Massachusetts cases8" in support of his argument that
should the executor neglect to plead the statute of non-claim and
and order is entered allowing a barred claim, such order is not
binding on the estate or the executor's surety.
78 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-714 (Reissue 1956).
79 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-701 to -715 (Reissue 1956).
80 Supra note 78.
81 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-606 (Reissue 1956).
82 DAME, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1928) § 397 at 410.
83 Estate of Fitzgerald v. First Nat. Bank of Chariton, 64 Neb. 260, 89
N.W. 813 (1902); In re Estate of Breuer, 155 Neb. 836, 54 N.W.2d 75
(1952); In re Estate of Cluck, 168 Neb. 13, 95 N.W.2d 161 (1959).
84 DAME, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1928) § 394 at 407.
85 Dawes v. Shed, 15 Mass. 6 (1818); Robinson v. Hodge, 117 Mass. 222
(1875).
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C. EXECUTOR HAS BURDEN OF PROOF OF DEFENSE OF PAYIENT
Where the executor pleads that the claim against the estate
was paid during the lifetime of the decedent, the executor assumes
the burden of proof.8 6 However, in the case of close family re-
lationships or of domestic servants, the rebuttable presumption
is that the services have been gratuitously performed or that they
have been completely paid for.87
Any person who may be affected by the final order, judgment,
or decree of the county court in a probate matter "shall" have
the right to appeal.8 8 Apparently the executor is under no duty
to appeal should the final order be adverse to the estate.8 9 If the
executor decides not to appeal, "any person interested in the estate
as creditor, devisee, legatee or heir may appeal from such decision"
and the proceedings will be in the executor's name as if the appeal
had been taken by the executor.9 0
IX. ASSETS SUBJECT TO CLAIMS
A. IN GENERAL
Generally all the property in the decedent's name only is con-
sidered to be assets subject to claims. This would include all
the tangible and intangible personal property as well as the real
estate.91 Also included are proceeds of judgments in suits in-
stituted by the decedent and still pending at the time of his death.
Proceeds of judgments in causes of actions which survive the death
of the decedent are properly included as assets subject to claims
if the actions must be maintained by the estate, rather than di-
rectly by the widow or heirs.9 2
The executor has the right to possession of all the real estate
of the deceased and may collect rents, issues and profits then
accruing if such are needed to pay the debts and expenses of
86 In re Estate of Johnson, 144 Neb. 372, 13 N.W.2d 412 (1944).
s7 In re Estate of Olson, 167 Neb. 799, 95 N.W.2d 128 (1959).
88 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1601 (Reissue 1956).
89 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1610 (Reissue 1956) clearly indicates that the
executor may decline to appeal and provides for other interested
parties to bring the appeal should the executor so decline.
00 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-1610 (Reissue 1956).
91 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-406 (Reissue 1956).
92 See infra section X(E) this article. The wrongful death actions are
brought in the name of the widow or heirs who are the real party in
interest.
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administration.93 If no rentals are then accruing, the executor may
lease the land and use the rentals therefrom until such debts have
been paid and the estate settled. A lease beyond the time of settle-
ment is voidable, but may be ratified by the heirs or devisees.
4
B. INSURANCE COMPANIES' OBLIGATION UNDER LABILrrY
POLICY INSURING THE DECEDENT
In the recent case of In re Kresovich's Estate9" the Nebraska
Supreme Court determined for the first time that insurance on
the life of the decedent was an asset of his estate in the juris-
diction where he was killed. In this case the insured was a resi-
dent of Illinois, the accident happened in Cherry County, Nebraska,
and the application for administration and later allowance of
claims took place in Lancaster County, Nebraska. The court al-
lowed the claimants to institute the proceedings and to file their
claims for injury and damages arising out of the action in which
the insured was killed, although the liability for the claims had
not been previously determined.9 6
C. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Where there is a deficiency of assets and the decedent shall
have made a fraudulent conveyance prior to his death, the execu-
tor may maintain a suit to have this conveyance set aside.97 To
do so, the executor must prove that there are creditors and that
there is a deficiency of assets as well as the fact that the convey-
ance was with intent to defraud such creditors.98 The creditor
may cause this suit to be brought by the executor, but the creditor
will have to pay part of the costs. If the conveyance has been to
the executor, the creditors may maintain the action in their own
names.19
D. GIFTS CAUSA MORTIS
Gifts causa mortis are valid as against the creditors if there
are sufficient assets to pay the creditors. If there is a deficiency,
93 Hahn v. Verret, 143 Neb. 820, 11 N.W.2d 551 (1943); In re Estate of
Large, 149 Neb. 783, 32 N.W.2d 751 (1948).
94 Chestnut v. Masters Laboratories, 148 Neb. 378, 27 N.W.2d 541 (1947).
95 In re Estate of Kresovich, 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d 239 (1959).
96 See Annot. 34 A.L.R.2d 1270 (1954).
97 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30415 to -417 (Reissue 1956).
98 Goodman-Buckley Trust Co. v. Poulos, 124 Neb. 697, 248 N.W. 64 (1933).
99 Becker v. Anderson, 6 Neb. 499 (1877).
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the executor may recover the subject of a gift causa mortis if he
can prove that the rights of the creditors are paramount to the
equitable rights of the donee.10 0
X. ASSETS NOT SUBJECT TO CLAIMS
This section covers the following three types of assets; first,
assets that are not subject to claims but under some circumstances
are includable in the estate for the determination of death taxes;
second, assets not subject to claims but collectible by the executor
for the benefit of survivors; and third, assets which under some
circumstances may be subject to claims.
A. LIFE INSURANCE PAYABLE TO BENEFICIARY OTHER
THAN ESTATE
Where a third person is named the beneficiary of a life insur-
ance policy, this third person takes the benefits therefrom by
contract and not derivatively. The proceeds from such a policy
form no part of the estate of the insured and the probate court
therefore has no jurisdiction over them.' 0 '
B. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPT FROm EXECUTION
When the decedent dies intestate, the widow, widower, or
children, "shall" be allowed, free from the claims of creditors,
all wearing apparel, ornaments, furniture and articles previously
exempt to the deceased. 0 2 It has been inferred that where there
is no homestead, the widow should be allowed $500.00 in personal
property in lieu of the homestead exemption. 03 The county court
"may make the same allowances" in a testate estate as in an in-
testate estate'0 4 although it may be argued that the word "allow-
ances" used here does not include specifically exempt articles. 0 5
C. HOMESTEAD INTEREST
If the homestead is needed for the payment of claims, $2,000.00
above encumbrances is exempt to the surviving spouse or depend-
100 Tyrell v. Judson, 112 Neb. 393, 199 N.W. 714 (1924).
101 In re Estate of Reynolds, 131 Neb. 557, 268 N.W. 480 (1936).
102 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-103, 30-104, 30-229 (Reissue 1956).
103 In re Estate of Nielsen, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N.W. 246 (1938).
104 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-229 (Reissue 1956).
105 In re Estate of Manning, 85 Neb. 60, 122 N.W. 711 (1909).
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ents. 0 6 If not needed for the payment of claims, the survivor's
life estate is set aside before distribution to the beneficiaries.10 7
The $2,000.00 limitation is solely for the purpose of fixing the rights
of the homestead claimants and the creditors respectively, and not
as between survivor and heir.10 8 The homestead may be selected
from the property in which the surviving spouse and the decedent
had an undivided interest, and is so, the full $2,000.00 is exempt
rather than a fractional share thereof.10 9  However, if the title
to homestead was in the name of the decedent and a predeceased
spouse as joint tenants with right of survivorship, there is no
homestead exemption unless there are dependent relatives.110
D. JOINTLY HELD PROPERTY
Prior to the enactment of section 30-6241' in 1955, the gen-
eral rule was that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship vested
the whole title in the survivor free from the debts of the deceased
joint tenant.112 The statute, 113 however, changes this rule and
gives a limited right to the creditor of a deceased joint tenant to
bring an action within three months after death against the sur-
viving joint tenant. This action would impress a lien upon the
deceased joint tenant's interest in the real estate, or personal
property, for the payment of debts when there is insufficient prop-
erty in the estate.
In a recent Lancaster District Court case, 114 District Judge
Paul W. White, in effect, held section 30-624115 unconstitutional.
Judge White pointed out that the statute allows the creditor to
bring an action in a "court of competent jurisdiction" but does
not define this term. Since the county court is vested by the
106 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 40-101, 40-117 (Reissue 1956).
107 NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-117 (Reissue 1956).
108 Meisner v. Hill, 92 Neb. 435, 138 N.W. 583 (1912).
109 Stocker v. Hilger, 144 Neb. 202, 13 N.W.2d 106 (1944).
110 Edgarton v. Hamilton County, 150 Neb. 821, 36 N.W.2d 258 (1949).
1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-624 (Reissue 1956).
112 DeForge v. Patrick, 162 Neb. 568, 76 N.W.2d 733 (1956). Although
this case was decided after the enactment of 30-624, the facts occurred
prior to 1955 and as a result this section of the statutes was not dis-
cussed in the opinion.
113 Supra note 107.
114 Buehler v. Kirby, Memorandum Opinion, 'Doc. 198, p. 187, Dist. Ct.
of Lancaster County, Nebr. (1959).
115 Supra note 107.
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constitution with original," 6 and by statute exclusive," 7 jurisdic-
tion over probate matters and settlement of claims against the
decedent, the only "court of competent jurisdiction" is the county
court. The claim being one against the decedent and not a per-
sonal claim against the surviving joint owner, it should be dealt
with like any other claim against the estate in the probate court.
Judge White stated that, as to the right to sue the surviving
joint tenant, the statute is contrary to the purposes for which we
have probate proceedings. The statute permits a multiplicity of
suits against the surviving joint tenant by any and all of the
unpaid creditors. Regardless of priorities, the unpaid creditor
could get a judgment against the surviving joint tenant and the
estate would have no opportunity to contest the validity of the
claim as against a widow's allowance or items of that nature." 8
E. RECOVERY UNDER LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT AND FEDERAL
EMPLOYER'S LiABmT ACT
The final sentence in section 30-810119 specifically provides
that any amount recovered in an action for wrongful death "shall
not be subject to any claims against the estate of such decedent."
This same proviso appeared in the act prior to the 1945 amend-
ment. The principal effect of the amendment was to shift the
formula for distribution out of the provisions of the intestate laws
of descent and to establish it on the basis of individual pecuniary
loss suffered by the persons for whose benefit the recovery was
made.' 2 0 The Federal Employer's Liability Act 121 also provides
that the recovery for death allowed thereunder shall be for the
benefit of the surviving relatives. 22
116 Neb. Const. art V, § 16.
117 NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-503 (Reissue 1956).
11s Supra note 114. Judge White states: "The statute, by its very terms,
contemplates that there is jurisdiction within the county court . ..
but provides . . . that then an independent action may be taken up
in the district court .... Obviously, this is an elaboration of and an
addition to the rights which are vested under the constitution in the
county court .... The statute contains no limiting provisions as to
the number of suits or claims . . . and there is an entire absence of
protective provisions with reference to . . . the estate .... [T]his
statute comes . . . squarely within the range of vices which in the
determination of estates the constitution sought to prevent ....
11 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-810 (Reissue 1956).
120 1 WHITFORD, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 436 (1954).
121 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
122 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1958. See I WHITFORD, PROBATE AND ADMINIS-
TRATION 465-478 (1954).
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
F. ADVANCEMENTS
The sections related to this topic12 3 discuss advancements and
provide that they shall be taken into account for purposes of
distribution among the heirs. However, an heir cannot be re-
quired to refund an advancement or portion thereof. Thus cred-
itors have no recourse to advancements to satisfy their claims. It
should be noted here that the word "advancement" is technically
applied to intestate estates only, but testators frequently make
similar provisions in their wills.
G. UNITED STATES SAVINGS BoNDs AND BANK AcCOUNTS
When United States Savings Bonds are registered in the names
of the deceased and another as co-owners, his death vests complete
ownership in the surviving co-owner by virtue of the Treasury
Department regulations. 124 The law effects the same result when
a bank account is in the name of two or more persons. 25 How-
ever, the executor may impose a constructive trust upon such
bonds and joint bank accounts by clear, satisfactory and convinc-
ing evidence. 126 Under these conditions, the bonds and bank ac-
counts may be available for the payment of claims.
XI. PRIORITIES
The statutes 27 provide that for the purpose of paying debts
and expenses, personal property shall be first subject to claims.
Should the total assets of the estate prove to be insufficient, the
funds will be distributed in the following order: taxes, 28 funeral
expenses, expenses of last illness, 12 9 debts having preference by
laws of the United States'3" and debts to other creditors.' 31
123 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-112 to -117 (Reissue 1956).
124 Nelson v. Rasmussen, 164 Neb. 274, 82 N.W.2d 418 (1957); Slocum v.
Bohuslov, 164 Neb. 156, 82 N.W.2d 39 (1957).
125 NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-167 (Reissue 1954). See Scriven v. Scriven,
153 Neb. 655, 45 N.W.2d 760 (1951).
126 Supra note 124.
127 NEB. REV. STAT. 30-405 (Reissue 1956).
128 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-103 (Reissue 1956).
129 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-615 (Reissue 1956).
130 Ibid. See also United States v. Swanson, 75 F. Supp. 118 (1947) ap-
peal dismissed, 171 F.2d 718 (1949).
131 Supra note 122.
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The testator may make provisions by will for the payment
of debts, expenses of administration and family expenses, and
designate the estate assets out of which they shall be paid. 132 In
the absence of a provision in the will to the contrary, claims shall
be satisfied out of assets of the estate in the following order:
first, the residuary estate; then other general legacies pro rata;
and last, the specific bequests or devises.133
132 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-230 (Reissue 1956).
133 In re Estate of Grenier, 168 Neb. 633, 97 N.W.2d 225 (1959).
